
What is a jus cogens rule?
The rules of jus cogens (also known as peremptory norm) are derived from the customary international law, [1] and it is a rule or principle which is so fundamental that it binds all states and does not allow any exceptions. [2] They are ‘accepted and recognized by the international community...
What is a jus cogens norm in the jus ad bellum?
Applying the methodology above to the jus ad bellum, we can conclude that the jus cogens norm in the jus ad bellum must be the customary norm which prohibits non-consensual force that does not fall within either of the two established so-called ‘exceptions’: authorisation under the UN Charter and self-defence.
What is jus cogens in Switzerland?
Also, theSwiss Constitution of 18 April 1999, Article 139 (2), states that if the law of nation which violates the international law, the Federal Assembly shall declare it invalid, whether as a whole or in part. In addition, it can be said that jus cogens is there to protect and uphold human dignity and rights.
What is the difference between jus cogens and jus positivism?
Jus cogens are mandatory, constant and binding on all states irrespective of their consent while jus positivism is not binding and can be changed from time to time.

What falls under jus cogens?
Examples of jus cogens norms include prohibitions against crimes against humanity, genocide, and human trafficking.
Is jus cogens legally binding?
Jus cogens, also known as the peremptory norm, is a fundamental and overriding principle of international law. It is a Latin phrase that translates to 'compelling law'. It is absolute in nature which means that there can be no defense for the commission of any act that is prohibited by jus cogens.
Can jus cogens be breached?
According to both Conventions, a treaty is void if it breaches jus cogens rules. JUS COGENS or ius cogens, meaning “compelling law” in Latin, are rules in international law that are peremptory or authoritative, and from which states cannot deviate.
What are the legal effect in jus cogens?
For a legal positivist, a jus cogens rule is in conflict with a rule of ordinary international law when: (i) both rules are binding on a legal subject at some particular point in time or during some particular time period; and (ii) both rules are applicable relative to some particular conduct or state of affairs; and ( ...
Is jus cogens a source of international law?
Most states and authors agree that jus cogens exists in international law. Opinions diverge however as to its exact content, sources, means of identification, and application, as well as to its precise effects and role within the international legal order.
Is jus cogens sovereignty?
Special Rapporteur Waldock himself gave sovereign equality as an example of a jus cogens rule. Further, at the Vienna Conference, several States described sovereign equality as a peremptory norm. Subsequently, the ilc's work on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility involved discussion of peremptory norms.
What is the difference between jus cogens and erga omnes?
Jus cogens refers to the legal status that certain international crimes reach, and obligatio erga omnes pertains to the legal implications arising out of a certain crime's characterization as jus cogens.
Is international law a true law?
On the other hand, International law is considered to be a true law and is regarded as a law, similar to that of ordinary laws of a state, binding upon the citizens.
Abstract
This article argues that if there is a jus cogens norm in the jus ad bellum, it must be the customary norm which prohibits non-consensual uses of force that are neither validly authorised under the UN Charter nor lawful exercises of self-defence.
Keywords
Copyright © The Author (s) 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press for the British Institute of International and Comparative Law
I. OBSTACLES TO IDENTIFYING THE JUS COGENS NORM IN THE JUS AD BELLUM
Referring to the extensive literature on the nature of jus cogens norms, Saul rightly observes that ‘ [w]hat is striking … is the general absence of detailed exploration of the methodological process that should be undertaken to determine whether or not a norm has jus cogens status’, with scholars instead focusing on justificatory theories for the concept of jus cogens. Footnote 1 Similarly, ‘ [t]he most prominent approach to the identification of jus cogens norms that is found in judicial practice is to accord a norm the status without further explanation’. Footnote 2 The same can be said of the practice of States, which typically assert that a particular norm has jus cogens status without setting out any detailed reasoning as to how that particular norm has been identified as jus cogens. Footnote 3 At most, such statements are accompanied by a vague reference to the importance of the norm, or to a previous judicial decision recognising the norm as having jus cogens status. Footnote 4 The International Law Commission (ILC) has also asserted in various outputs that a norm has jus cogens status without providing any detailed reasoning in support, most recently including in the annex to its draft conclusions on peremptory norms ‘a non-exhaustive list of norms previously referred to by the Commission as having peremptory character’. Footnote 5.
II. A NORM OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
The language of Article 53 makes clear that jus cogens norms do not constitute a separate source of international law; they arise from an existing norm of ‘general international law’ which is then recognised as having jus cogens status. Footnote 22 In practice, there are no examples of a jus cogens norm being recognised without or before the norm has an independent existence as a norm of positive international law.
III. ACCEPTED AND RECOGNISED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE AS A NORM FROM WHICH NO DEROGATION IS PERMITTED
The second criterion for the identification of jus cogens norms is sometimes described as an enhanced form of opinio juris. Footnote 44 This is perhaps a useful analogy to the extent that both involve the acceptance by States that a norm has a particular legal effect—binding as law in the case of ordinary custom, impermissibility of derogation for jus cogens —and that this acceptance also constitutes that norm as custom or jus cogens respectively.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE JUS AD BELLUM
Applying the methodology above to the jus ad bellum, we can conclude that the jus cogens norm in the jus ad bellum must be the customary norm which prohibits non-consensual force that does not fall within either of the two established so-called ‘exceptions’: authorisation under the UN Charter and self-defence.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the jus cogens norm in the jus ad bellum is the customary norm which prohibits non-consensual force that does not fall within either of the two apparent exceptions: authorisation under the UN Charter and self-defence.
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