
Universal is a term that describes qualities of a thing, and particulars are non-abstract objects that people encounter in the world. The four views regarding the nature of universals and particulars are nominalism, realism (exaggerated and moderate), conceptualism.
What are universals and particulars in philosophy?
Universals, in philosophy, are the features or qualities which many objects may share. Redness and squareness are both universals, since they are features or qualities which many objects share: all red objects possess the former universal, all square objects possess the latter. Particulars are the things or objects which possess universals.
What is the difference between an individual and a universal?
Universals Universals are a class of mind-independent entities, usually contrasted with individuals (or so-called “particulars”), postulated to ground and explain relations of qualitative identity and resemblance among individuals. Individuals are said to be similar in virtue of sharing universals.
Are there particulars?
Stephen is the preeminent example of a particular. If he is not really a particular, then nothing else is either. But it is self-evident that there are particulars. All self-evident sentences are true. Therefore, there are particulars.
What is an example of a universal?
An apple and a ruby are both red, for example, and their common redness results from sharing a universal. If they are both red at the same time, the universal, red, must be in two places at once. This makes universals quite different from individuals; and it makes them controversial.

What is the difference between particulars and universals?
Paradigmatically, universals are abstract (e.g. humanity), whereas particulars are concrete (e.g. the personhood of Socrates). However, universals are not necessarily abstract and particulars are not necessarily concrete. For example, one might hold that numbers are particular yet abstract objects.
What are particulars in philosophy?
Particulars in the philosophical tradition are items that are numerically one. 'A particular' is 'one thing', like a dog, a jet plane, a stone or an angel, say. Usually particulars are thought of as material and perceptible items; that is the most obvious connotation the term has, anyway.
What is a universal in philosophy?
universal, in philosophy, an entity used in a certain type of metaphysical explanation of what it is for things to share a feature, attribute, or quality or to fall under the same type or natural kind. A pair of things resembling each other in any of these ways may be said to have (or to “exemplify”) a common property.
What is the problem of universals and particulars?
The problem of universals is an ancient question from metaphysics that has inspired a range of philosophical topics and disputes: Should the properties an object has in common with other objects, such as color and shape, be considered to exist beyond those objects?
What are particulars in a language?
Noun. particulars pl (plural only) The details or specifics of something. The overall plan is well understood, but we still have to work out the particulars.
How does Aristotle define the universal?
In Aristotle's view, universals are incorporeal and universal, but only exist only where they are instantiated; they exist only in things. Aristotle said that a universal is identical in each of its instances. All red things are similar in that there is the same universal, redness, in each thing.
What are Aristotle's arguments on universals and particulars?
Aristotle refutes this separation of universals from particulars in two simple ways: first, he argues that Forms cannot constitute a substance; and, secondly, that since Forms are not substances, Forms cannot cause a substance's coming into being.
What is known as the universal?
Water is called the 'universal solvent' because it is capable of dissolving more substances than any other liquid.
What is a universal truth?
Answer: Universal truth implies widely accepted facts which does not change over period, circumstance, location, and so on. These are the reality that are accepted with no doubt.
What is Plato's theory of universals?
Platonic realism is the philosophical position that universals or abstract objects exist objectively and outside of human minds. It is named after the Greek philosopher Plato who applied realism to such universals, which he considered ideal forms.
Do you think universals exist?
Therefore, the idea of universals in and of themselves is merely a mental construct. Universal themselves do not exist. The realist however disagrees with this position and instead holds that universals do indeed exist as separate and unique entities. The most famous example of this school of thought is Plato's forms.
Who introduced the problem of universals?
The question on which Peter Abelard (c. 1079–1142) originally made his name and indeed the question that engaged philosophers at the fledgling school at Paris was the so-called problem of universals (common terms like "animal" or "man").
What is a particular Plato?
Particulars. In Platonic realism, forms are related to particulars (instances of objects and properties) in that a particular is regarded as a copy of its form. For example, a particular apple is said to be a copy of the form of applehood and the apple's redness is an instance of the form of Redness.
What is the meaning of particulars explain about its objects?
(pəʳtɪkjʊləz ) plural noun. The particulars of something or someone are facts or details about them which are written down and kept as a record.
What is a concrete particular?
* concrete particulars, in turn divided into Things (objects, physical items) and Events (e.g collisions, or my feeling bored, which we can regard as a mental Event or as a mental Thing if you wish). * abstract particulars (eg numbers, propositions).
What makes something universal?
The uni in universal means "one" so this word is all about "one for all and all for one." If it's universal, it applies to all cases. Like the universe itself, a universal emotion is one that every human can understand or relate to. The desire for your children to be safe and happy is universal.
What is a particular in philosophy?
Particulars in the philosophical tradition are items that are numerically one . ‘A particular’ is ‘ one thing’, like a dog, a jet plane, a stone or an angel, say. Usually particulars are thought of as material and perceptible items; that is the most obvious connotation the term has, anyway.
What is universals in Aristotle's view?
The standard Aristotelian view and the most accessible part of his doctrine, anyway, is that universals are kinds of things, not things. ‘Dog’, e.g., would be a kind, so Fido and Beefy would be individuals of the same kind. Their natures would have the exact same definition, but the dogginess of Fido would be numerically distinct from the dogginess of Beefy. But there is a dubbelness here which lead to Aristotle talking about forms in a dual manner: Primary form is the essence which is expressed in a definition, it is this essence which is the subject of scientific knowledge; secondary form is an essence which is actualized in a particular thing, a form+matter compound. The former is “a such”, the latter is “a this”, as Aristotle expresses it; the former is a universal the latter is a particular. Both exist according to Aristotle, but they exist in different ways. The problem is just that it is so hard to understand how “suches”, the universals, exist.
What is the ontological status of universals?
The ontological status of universals is analogous to that of a line, Boethius explains: A line only subsists in some body and no line can exist separated from body. Yet when the mind cognizes the image of a complex perception, and since the mind possesses a capacity to divide and isolate the elements of complex perceptions (as well as synthesizing them), it can perceive within itself the image of- and form concepts of such elements individually. Among the elements perceived in complex perceptions are lines, and hence the mind may perceive within itself the image of- and form the concept of a line. In that case, the mind cognizes an incorporeal item of such a nature as to never be able to exist without a body, yet the mind would, according to this argument, cognize that item with respect to its true properties – in fact, the argument claims that the only way to cognize the true properties of lines (or any universal) is to cognize them in abstraction from any other thing. So though the mind cognizes in isolation something which can never exist in isolation, it nevertheless cognizes that something with respect to its true properties. This is how the mind cognizes genera, species, differentiae, and all other universals, according to this argument.
What is the only thing that corresponds to Aristotle's definition of universals?
In the subtile and difficult work Logica Ingredientibus Abelard argues that the only kind of thing which corresponds to Aristotle’s definition of universals in De Interpretatione – “that which is apt to be predicated of many things” – are words. So only words can be universals. Abelard thus represented a nominalist stance on universals, and his rejection of the idea that logic basically treats of “real” entities instead of words and sentences, was influential in steering the scholastic movement away from realism and paved the way for Ockham and, later, the British empiricists.
What is it called when two things have in common?
If you are inclined to say that the kind of thing that two or more things can have in common is just a name, a linguistic item, then you are inclined to be a nominalist. You are inclined to believe that universals are nominal.
What kind of thing do two or more things have in common?
If you are inclined to say that the kind of thing that two or more things can have in common is a mental item, a mental representation or a concept, then you are inclined to be a conceptualist. You are inclined to believe that universals are concepts.
What is the object that is a product of the active intellect?
External objects call forth sense-impressions in us, which are transmuted by the active intellect into mental images. These images are a product of the active intellect, not species which flow from the object into the potential intellect. The reality of these images is thus, in the modern use of the terms, not objective but subjective. The result of this line of reasoning is the absolute subjectivity of all concepts and universals, and the limitation of knowledge to the mind and its concepts – although these are real entities because of their subjective existence in the mind.
What is the nature of universals?
The Nature of Universals. In fundamental debates in metaphysics, it can be useful to understand the type of entity or concept in contrastive terms. For instance, it is helpful to understand universals by contrasting them with individuals.
What is universals in psychology?
Universals are a class of mind-independent entities, usually contrasted with individuals (or so-called “particulars”), postulated to ground and explain relations of qualitative identity and resemblance among individuals. Individuals are said to be similar in virtue of sharing universals. An apple and a ruby are both red, for example, ...
How do conceptualists explain similarity among individuals?
Conceptualists explain similarity among individuals by appealing to general concepts or ideas, things that exist only in minds. Nominalists, in contrast, are content to leave relations of qualitative resemblance brute and ungrounded.
How to explain qualitative identity?
How can we explain the qualitative identity of distinct individuals without relying on universals? One strategy begins by giving an account of what makes a single individual, which we will call “Tom,” red. A minimal, but perhaps sufficient answer is to say that Tom is red because the predicate “is red” can be truly said of Tom. As for the predicate “is red” itself, it is just a particular string of words on a page (or this screen), or else a string of spoken sounds. Expanding this strategy we get the view that two individuals, say Tom and Bob, are red simply because the linguistic expression, the predicate “is red,” is truly said of both. We account for commonality in nature by reference to individuals—in this case the individuals Bob and Tom, and also linguistic expressions such as the predicate “is red.”
What are the most fundamental entities in reality?
An inventory of reality’s most fundamental entities would almost certainly include individuals. Individuals are singular objects. They can exist over time, but in only one place at a time. Individuals also have properties (also called qualities), at least most of which can vary over time. A ripening apple goes from being green to being red, for instance. Almost everyone agrees that individual apples exist, and that they are colored, but are redness and greenness entities themselves? If so, what are they like? And if redness and greenness are not real entities, how could our apple be colored at all? Without its distinctive qualities, an apple wouldn’t even be an apple.
Why do we need universals?
Relatedly, some philosophers have argued that we need universals to understand the stable, unchanging laws of nature that govern individuals’ changes. Indeed, it has been argued that a law of nature just is a relation among universals, by which one universal brings about, or necessitates, others.
When are three red tropes mutually resembling?
When three red tropes are mutually resembling, then, in addition to the red tropes themselves, there are three resemblance tropes. And just as the resemblance among the three red individuals is a basic fact, so too is the resemblance among these resemblance relations.
Kenny, Geach, and the Perils of Reading Frege into Aquinas
I have been studying Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Being (Oxford 2002). I cannot report that I find it particularly illuminating. I am troubled by the reading back of Fregean doctrines into Aquinas, in particular in the appendix, "Frege and Aquinas on Existence and Number." (pp.
The Ramsey Problem and the Problem of the Intrinsically Unpropertied Particular
What exactly is the distinction between a universal and a particular? Universals are often said to be repeatable entities, ones-over-many or ones-in-many. Particulars, then, are unrepeatable entities.
