
What is personal identity in philosophy?
Personal identity deals with philosophical questions that arise about ourselves by virtue of our being people (or, as lawyers and philosophers like to say, persons ). This contrasts with questions about ourselves that arise by virtue of our being living things, conscious beings, material objects, or the like.
What is the question of identity?
This is the question of personal identity, and it is literally a question of life and death, as the correct answer to it determines which types of changes a person can undergo without ceasing to exist.
What is the philosophical problem of numerically identical people?
The philosophical problem is that although it seems that that a person remains numerically identical throughout their life, it is very difficult to give a satisfying answer to what accounts for this numerical identity.
When did philosophers begin to believe in personal identity?
But most philosophers writing on personal identity since the early 20th century have endorsed some version of this view. The memory criterion mentioned earlier is an example.

What does Plato say about identity?
Abstract. Among the concepts central to Plato's metaphysical vision are those of identity, sameness, and difference. For example, it is on the basis of a claim about putative cases of sameness among different things that Plato postulates the existence of separate Forms.
What philosopher talks about identity?
The modern formulation of identity is that of Gottfried Leibniz, who held that x is the same as y if and only if every predicate true of x is true of y as well. Leibniz's ideas have taken root in the philosophy of mathematics, where they have influenced the development of the predicate calculus as Leibniz's law.
What does Descartes believe about personal identity?
Descartes and the Soul Descartes claimed that the soul is fully responsible for thought, actions, and feelings, equating it to the mind. According to Descartes, “it is certain that I, [that is, my mind, by which I am what I am], is entirely and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it”.
What is Hume's view on personal identity?
(3) Hume believes that the common belief in personal identity results from human nature, and points out that the belief is neither a result of sense or of reason, but rather a result of imagination. Hence, there is no justification for the belief in personal identity.
What is John Locke's theory?
In politics, Locke is best known as a proponent of limited government. He uses a theory of natural rights to argue that governments have obligations to their citizens, have only limited powers over their citizens, and can ultimately be overthrown by citizens under certain circumstances.
What is self by Plato?
Plato, at least in many of his dialogues, held that the true self of human beings is the reason or the intellect that constitutes their soul and that is separable from their body. Aristotle, for his part, insisted that the human being is a composite of body and soul and that the soul cannot be separated from the body.
What is self According to Socrates?
And contrary to the opinion of the masses, one's true self, according to Socrates, is not to be identified with what we own, with our social status, our reputation, or even with our body. Instead, Socrates famously maintained that our true self is our soul.
What is self according to Immanuel Kant?
According to him, we all have an inner and an outer self which together form our consciousness. The inner self is comprised of our psychological state and our rational intellect. The outer self includes our sense and the physical world. When speaking of the inner self, there is apperception.
What is the philosophy of René Descartes?
René Descartes is most commonly known for his philosophical statement, “I think, therefore I am” (originally in French, but best known by its Latin translation: "Cogito, ergo sum”).
How do Locke's and Hume's notions of personal identity differ?
John Locke considers personal identity to be founded on consciousness, and not on the substance of either the soul or the body. While Hume argues that identity is nothing but exists on the relations of causation, contiguity, and resemblances obtained among the perceptions.
What is the philosophy of David Hume?
Hume was an Empiricist, meaning he believed "causes and effects are discoverable not by reason, but by experience". He goes on to say that, even with the perspective of the past, humanity cannot dictate future events because thoughts of the past are limited, compared to the possibilities for the future.
Why is Hume wrong about personal identity?
Hume thus claim that the identity we prescribe ourselves cannot be a perfect one because we are never the same perception, unchanging and uninterrupted, but quite the opposite. It is therefore impossible to have sameness over time, numerical or otherwise.
Who is the founder of identity theory?
Sheldon Stryker, the founder of Identity Theory.
Who made the identity theory?
The earliest advocates of Type Identity—U.T. Place, Herbert Feigl, and J.J.C. Smart, respectively—each proposed their own version of the theory in the late 1950s to early 60s.
Who created the identity theory?
Social identity theory developed from a series of studies, frequently called minimal-group studies, conducted by the British social psychologist Henri Tajfel and his colleagues in the early 1970s.
Who proposed social identity theory?
TajfelSocial identity theory was proposed in social psychology by Tajfel and his colleagues (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Social identity refers to the ways that people's self-concepts are based on their membership in social groups.
What is the question of personal identity?
This is sometimes called the question of personal identity over time. That’s because it’s about whether the earlier being and the later being are one or two—that is, whether they are numerically identical. An answer to it is an account of our persistence conditions.
Who edited the Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind?
Some material in this entry appeared previously in E. Olson, ‘Personal Identity’, in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by S. Stich and T. Warfield, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.
What is identity crisis?
To have an “identity crisis” is to become unsure of what one’s most characteristic properties are—of what sort of person, in some deep and fundamental sense, one is. This “personal identity” contrasts with ethnic or national identity, which consists roughly of the ethnic group or nation one takes oneself to belong to and ...
Is Western philosophy abstruse?
Others are more abstruse. They have been discussed since the origins of Western philosophy, and most major figures have had something to say about them. (There is also a rich literature on the topic in Eastern philosophy, which won't be discussed; see, e.g., Jinpa 2002, and the entry mind in Indian Buddhist philosophy .)
Is being a philosopher and a parent his identity?
It could happen that being a philosopher and a parent belong to my identity, but not being a man and living in Yorkshire, while someone else has the same four properties but feels differently towards them, so that being a man and living in Yorkshire belong to his identity but not being a philosopher or a parent.
Is there a single problem with personal identity?
There is no single problem of personal identity, but rather a wide range of questions that are at best loosely connected. Discussions in this area do not always make clear which one is at stake. Here are the most familiar:
Is memory a psychological connection?
Having a current memory (or quasi-memory) of an earlier experience is one sort of psychological connection—the experience causes the memory of it—but there are others. The important point is that our current mental states can be caused in part by mental states we were in at times when we were unconscious.
What is numerical identity?
Numerical identity is a term that philosophers use to describe an object being the very same object. It is contrasted with qualitative identity which simply means that an object has all the same properties or qualities.
Who said I remain the same person through time?
John Locke (1632-1704) claimed that I remain the same person through time because I am conscious of being the same person through time and that “as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person.”.
How many identical Dennetts are there?
In the last stage of the story, before the computer and Dennett’s brain have gotten out of sync, it appears that there are two , numerically identical Dennetts, since the information (memories, beliefs, desires) on the clone of Dennett’s brain on the computer is identical to Dennett’s brain.
Can our souls stay the same?
Although our bodies, our beliefs, and our values may change radically throughout our lifetimes, our soul is thought to stay the same . However, if it is possible for our souls to leave our bodies and inhabit other bodies (such as in reincarnation) then it seems problematic for souls to ground my personal identity.
Is being called the same name an extrinsic property?
Being called the by the same name (or perceived by people to be the same object) over time is a good example of an extrinsic property since it is not something that the object itself contains but, rather, something that is “put onto” the objection from outside.
Is DNA the basis of identity?
Clearly identical twins are two different persons. But if DNA were the basis of personal identity, there would be only one person.
What is the persistence question?
The persistence question, the question of what personal identity over time consists in, is literally a question of life and death: answers to it determine, insofar as that is possible, the conditions under which we survive, or cease to exist in the course of, certain adventures.
What is the third criterion of personal identity?
A third criterion of personal identity is that we are our bodies, that is to say, that personal identity is constituted by some brute physical relation between , for example, different bodies or different life-sustaining systems at different times.
What is Derek Parfit's theory?
Derek Parfit proposes a theory of the ontological status of persons, which promises to answer the problem of fission and the paradox of personal identity. While this article cannot do justice to the complexities of Parfit’s theory, which has been the focal point of debate since 1970, it is worth mentioning its main features.
What does being the person that you are from one day to the next necessarily consist in?
Personal Identity. What does being the person that you are, from one day to the next, necessarily consist in? This is the question of personal identity, and it is literally a question of life and death, as the correct answer to it determines which types of changes a person can undergo without ceasing to exist.
Is memory necessary for identity?
Second, memory alone is not necessary for personal identity, as lack of memory through periods of sleep or coma do not obliterate one’s survival of these states . Appeal to causal and cognitive connections which relate not only memory but other psychological aspects is sufficient to eradicate the problem.
Can personal identity relations be direct memory connections?
Since this conclusion violates the transitivity of identity (which states that if an X is identical with a Y, and the Y is identical with a Z, then the X must be identical with the Z), personal identity relations cannot consist in direct memory connections.
Is the old man identical to the kid?
In that case the kid is identical with the primary school teacher and the primary school teacher is identical with the old man; the old man, however, is not identical with the kid.
What does Hume say about personal identity?
Hume says that all that “we” are is a bundle of perceptions at any given reference point.
What is bodily identity?
Bodily identity is the claim that personal identity is no different from identity of other objects, like a book. This view conforms to our ordinary usage of identity terms and makes sense, prima facie, but is has some glaring problems. Earlier, when referencing the book I asked a series of questions.
Why is Hume's self different from other points in time?
So, what we identify as ourselves at any one point in time is different from any other point in time because the bundle has changed. The new experience or impressions have necessarily changed the bundle from its previous state.
What if you think you have a brain but a completely different body?
If you think that the person that has your brain but a completely different body is you then you must reject the bodily identity theory in favor of a more specific, brain criterion theory (we’ll get back to the brain theory in subsequent posts). Any way you cut it the brain is of crucial importance when thinking about personal identity, ...
Who said x is the same as y?
Philosopher/Mathematician Gottfried Leibniz has a way of dealing with such questions. Leibniz Law, as it is referred to, claims that “x is the same as y if and only if every predicate true of x is true of y as well.”.
Is Hume's self an illusion?
The ‘self’ for Hume, when perceived as something fixed through time, is an illusion. Strict identity claims are simply false when talking about ourselves as persisting through time.The bundle of perceptions changes with each experience, therefore, there is no one enduring ‘self’ that persists through each experience.
What is the philosophical concept of identity?
The philosophical concept of identity is distinct from the better-known notion of identity in use in psychology and the social sciences. The philosophical concept concerns a relation, specifically, a relation that x and y stand in if, and only if they are one and the same thing, or identical to each other (i.e. if, and only if x = y ).
Who said that identity is not a relation between objects?
Some philosophers have denied that there is such a relation as identity. Thus Ludwig Wittgenstein writes ( Tractatus 5.5301): "That identity is not a relation between objects is obvious.".
What is the identity of Hegel?
In Hegel 's words, "Identity is the identity of identity and non-identity.". More recent metaphysicians have discussed trans-world identity —the notion that there can be the same object in different possible worlds. An alternative to trans-world identity is the counterpart relation in Counterpart theory. It is a similarity relation that rejects ...
What did Hegel say about identity?
In Hegel 's words, "Identity is the identity of identity and non-identity. ".
What is the alternative to trans-world identity?
An alternative to trans-world identity is the counterpart relation in Counterpart theory. It is a similarity relation that rejects trans-world individuals and instead defends an objects counterpart – the most similar object. Some philosophers have denied that there is such a relation as identity. Thus Ludwig Wittgenstein writes ( Tractatus 5.5301): ...
What is the sociological definition of identity?
The sociological notion of identity, by contrast, has to do with a person's self-conception, social presentation, and more generally, the aspects of a person that make them unique, or qualitatively different from others (e.g. cultural identity, gender identity, national identity, online identity and processes of identity formation ).
Who invented the law of identity?
The law of identity originates from classical antiquity. The modern formulation of identity is that of Gottfried Leibniz, who held that x is the same as y if and only if every predicate true of x is true of y as well. Leibniz's ideas have taken root in the philosophy of mathematics, where they have influenced the development ...
What is personal identity?
The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical
What is Patricia Williams' essay about identity?
Williams asks the philosophical question, "Are we worried about Storm's identity or our own?" Her argument implies that we worry about our own identity as she describes her analytical process , a personal narration from which she derives her analytical thoughts, as well as an analogy. Williams' writing thoughts are effectively expressed in her essay and consequently, the philosophical question, "are we
How long was the dialogue in Perry's Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality?
In Perry’s Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality there is a conversation between three characters that lasted over a period of three nights. The way the dialogue of the conversation was set up was that each night the topic of the argument will get more intense , tricky and complicated. The argument against and for immortality between two characters, Gretchen and Sam, and the argument of Personal Identity, is in a way inviting the reader or audience to the discussion to create their own
What is the essence of existentialism?
The essence of existentialism is authenticity of experience, asking the philosopher to undergo deep introspection. However, existentialism is perhaps most famous for its probing questions about what Friedrich Nietzsche called the "tension of the soul," (2). Known colloquially as existential angst, the "tension of the soul," search for meaning and purpose in life has characterized personal and collective

The Problems of Personal Identity
Understanding The Persistence Question
Accounts of Our Persistence
Psychological-Continuity Views
Fission
The Too-Many-Thinkers Problem
Brute-Physical Views
Wider Themes
- The debate between psychological-continuity and brute-physical viewscannot be settled without considering more general matters outside ofpersonal identity. For instance, psychological-continuity theoristsneed to explain why human organisms are unable to think as we do. Thiswill require an account of the nature of mental properties. Or ifhuman organ...
Introduction: The Persistence Question
Personal Identity as An Unchanging, Intrinsic Property
Personal Identity as Psychological Continuity
- John Locke (1632-1704) claimed that I remain the same person through time because I am conscious of being the same person through time and that “as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person.” Locke’s criterion is commonly interpreted as a memory criterion of persona...
Personal Identity as Bodily Continuity
Dennett’s “Where Am I?”
The Narrative Conception of The Self
Understanding The Problem of Personal Identity
Theories of Personal Identity
The Paradox of Personal Identity
Parfit and The Unimportance of Personal Identity
- Derek Parfit proposes a theory of the ontological status of persons, which promises to answer the problem of fission and the paradox of personal identity. While this article cannot do justice to the complexities of Parfit’s theory, which has been the focal point of debate since 1970, it is worth mentioning its main features. Although Parfit affirms...
References and Further Reading