Clausewitz sees war as completely subordinate to policy. In On War, he explains that “The political object—the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.” [6] In his view, “war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”
What is the object of war, according to Clausewitz?
To Clausewitz, ‘War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale… an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will,’ directed by political motives and morality. (Clausewitz 1940: Book I, Ch. I) War is neither a scientific game nor an international sport; it is an act of violence, characterized by destruction.
What does Clausewitz mean with war is instrumental?
For Clausewitz, war is merely an extension of politics. It means that war is just another tool in the political game. But Clausewitz also means in a more profound sense. For him, the objectives of war are always political objectives, and that war must always be subservient to politics.
What is a Clausewitzian definition of war?
War is a trial of moral and physical forces by means of the latter. . . In the last analysis it is at moral, not physical strength that all military action is directed … Moral factors, then, are the ultimate determinants in war. Carl von Clausewitz. War of course involves a contest of physical force. It is a blood sport.
What is the devil theory of war?
The devil theory of war: an inquiry into the nature of history and the possibility of keeping out of war. The devil theory of war: an inquiry into the nature of history and the possibility of keeping out of war.
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What is Clausewitz strategy of war?
On the strategic level, Clausewitz wrote that victory in war required: 1) the complete or partial destruction of the enemy's armed forces; 2) the occupation of his country; and 3) the breaking of his will to fight.
What does Clausewitz say about total war?
As wars cannot run themselves and require politics and society to exist, Clausewitz held that ideal war was impossible because political and military leaders cannot avoid these influences.
What are the key characteristics of war as Clausewitz understands it?
Clausewitz identifies "danger, physical exertion, intelligence and friction as the elements that coalesce to form the atmosphere of war, and turn it into a medium that impedes activity." This general friction makes military forces less effective in combat and his prescription is experience.
What is the nature of war according to Clausewitz?
Clausewitz defined war as 'an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,' and 'merely the continuation of policy by other means. '2 From this, we understand that war is functionally a political tool used for the attainment of a political objective.
What did Carl von Clausewitz argue?
The first is his dialectical thesis: "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." The second, often treated as Clausewitz's 'bottom line,' is in fact merely his dialectical antithesis: "War is merely the continuation of policy with other means."
What does clausewitzian mean?
Adhering to or described by the military theory of Carl von Clausewitz.
How is Clausewitz relevant today?
As Clausewitz clarifies: “war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument”, which means that war contains the means that can be used to achieve a political object (Clausewitz 1976: 87). This statement is still very much applicable to present-day warfare and especially to the War on Terror.
What is the Clausewitz Trinity?
Clausewitz describes war in holistic. terms as a paradoxical trinity comprised. of the tendencies of the people, the. commander and his army, and the gov- ernment.
What are the 3 types of war?
The three pure types of war may be called absolute war, instru- mental war, and agonistic fighting. Absolute war is unrestricted and unregulated war, agonistic fighting is regulated according to norms, and instrumental war may or may not be restricted, according to considerations of expediency.
What are the three interacting forces in the nature of war according to Carl Clausewitz?
Another important principle introduced by Clausewitz was that of 'trinitarian war'. According to him, war is often the result of three interacting elements:passion and hatred; chance and probability; and policy/politics.
What infuses war with moral factors?
It is the human dimension which infuses war with its intangible moral factors. War is shaped by human nature and is subject to the complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiarities which characterize human behavior. Human will, instilled through leadership, is the driving force of all action in war.
What is the concept of war?
War is generally defined as violent conflict between states or nations. Nations go to war for a variety of reasons. It has been argued that a nation will go to war if the benefits of war are deemed to outweigh the disadvantages, and if there is a sense that there is not another mutually agreeable solution.
What is the theory of total war?
Total war is a type of warfare that includes any and all civilian-associated resources and infrastructure as legitimate military targets, mobilizes all of the resources of society to fight the war, and gives priority to warfare over non-combatant needs.
What is the Clausewitz Trinity?
Clausewitz describes war in holistic. terms as a paradoxical trinity comprised. of the tendencies of the people, the. commander and his army, and the gov- ernment.
How did Clausewitz's trinity theory help the understanding of war?
The idea of trinity offered by von Clausewitz revolutionized his peers’ approach to understanding war by shifting the focus from military forces to more complex relationships between the three interested parties, especially people. Before his successful attempt to provide a concise description of processes behind any war, prominent theorists of the nineteenth and previous centuries failed to recognize war as a “human-centric activity,” which limited their understanding of warfare. 13 Therefore, the trinity theory, especially its component linked to people, led to the recognition of new factors in warfare.
What did Clausewitz do to encourage the military?
By placing people, along with authorities and military organizations, in the center of attention, von Clausewitz started the tradition of emphasizing the human element in warfare, thus encouraging military leaders to develop new priorities. For instance, in his discussion of human nature in the work titled On Warfare, he encourages strategists to take the human factor into account, “find room for courage, boldness, even foolhardiness,” and understand war as a game and people as the players. 14
What was the purpose of the center of gravity theory?
The theory of the center of gravity shed light on the key sources of power helping great military leaders of the past to win and explained connections between such sources and the types of conflicts. It also found reflection in military strategies, including strategic bombing, whereas the trinity theory helped to make the perspective on warfare more human-centered. Even though the theories were formulated with reference to the incidents of the long ago, military professionals can still apply the main points to today’s realia in some instances.
How did the center of gravity improve people's knowledge of warfare?
The theorist’s center of gravity improved people’s knowledge of warfare by explaining a variety of such “centers’ and linking them to the classification of conflicts. The army, according to the author’s analysis, was the principal source of power for famous rulers of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, such as Charles XII of Sweden, Gustav II Adolf, and Frederick the Great, but it was not the universal rule. 4
How did the center of gravity influence the development of air forces?
As a concept, the center of gravity also influenced prominent military leaders’ understanding of air offensives and their strategic advantages. For example, Hans von Seeckt, who was a German colonel-general from 1920 to 1926, argued for the creation of independent air forces with reference to the center of gravity. 9 To him, any nation had its own centers of gravity, and the very emergence of offensive aviation could place those sources of strength in jeopardy. 10 Based on that, the theory made some contributions to the development of inhuman but effective air warfare techniques in the twentieth century.
How did the theory of capturing the capital help society?
The theory helped society to gain new practically relevant knowledge by drawing links between particular centers of gravity and the types of armed conflicts. For instance, capturing the capital was a viable solution in case of domestic strife, whereas to suppress popular uprisings, it was reasonable to focus on attacks “on the personalities of the leaders and public opinion.” 5 As for the latter, it is much easier to implement this knowledge today due to the development of modern means of communication and the resulting new opportunities for defamation and manipulation.
Who formulated the concept of the trinity and the center of gravity?
To express his understanding of war as a socio-cultural phenomenon, Carl von Clausewitz , a prominent specialist in military theory and practice, formulated the concepts of the trinity and the center of gravity in his famous work titled On War. In the past, the theories informed people’s perspectives on warfare by stressing the role of the human factor in armed hostilities, explaining success at war with attention to the sources of power, and influencing the development of new military tactics.
What does Clausewitz mean by war?
To support previous points, Clausewitz describes war as “…a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed – that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts.”.
What is Clausewitz's conclusion?
Firstly, particularly noteworthy is his famous conclusion that “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”. [3] The essence of this theory was Clausewitz’s description of the vertical continuum of war (policy and strategy tactics), which he presents in the strategic “ends, ways, and means” paradigm.
Why is Clausewitz important?
Clausewitz is further important today because of his efforts to grasp the intrinsic nature of war. His approach, philosophical in its method, is not to be interpreted as a checklist or a quantitative measure on how to address a war.
What is the best way to win a war?
The best path to victory is the so-called western way of war, as it calls for the most initiative and decisiveness, and as such has a high chance of success. As Geoffrey Parker sees, this approach to war rests on five principal foundations: “Superior technology, discipline, an aggressive Western military tradition, a unique ability to challenge and respond dynamically, and the capability to easily mobilize capital.” [14] All five of these pillars have continuity throughout history, and consequently have impacted today’s Western militaries. This is clear not only with regard to superior technology and military discipline, but also the flexibility and adaptability of western military structures and organizations in the face of new global challenges. No one could imagine military formations just fifteen years ago that would be successful in today’s conditions of asymmetric war. Though these five principles are considered essential preconditions for success, today’s wars require a rather fine balance between the application of aggressive military strategy and kinetic means with the use of non-kinetic-oriented strategies. This is especially valid in counterinsurgency operations, such as those conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq.
What is strategy in warfare?
Strategy is about ends and the means of achieving them; it is concerned with the highest level of planning, with clear end goals, and a broad picture of how to reach them. While losing at the tactical level of warfare does not necessarily mean losing the war, losing at the strategic level most often implies that the war is about to be lost if either the strategy, key officers, or both are not changed: “The original means of strategy is victory [in engagements] – that is, tactical success; its ends, in the final analysis, are those objects which will lead directly to peace.” [17] Although we live in the twenty-first century—technologically completely different from Clausewitz’s time—his fundamental definitions are still valid.
What is the military's support during war?
An essential element of support to the military during war is the backing of the public, which is strongest when it is directly exposed to threat. Only an active and decisive comprehensive approach can lead to victory. In terms of efficiency, the most successful waging of war uses the Western approach with its superior technology, discipline, and aggressive military tradition, along with the ability to respond dynamically and the capacity to mobilize capital. Regarding strategy, it is both an art and a science in using means to reach the ends of policy. Determining strategy is a highly demanding activity for its makers in the extremely complex contemporary world.
What is the first point of the argument that war is an extension of policy?
Three crucial points will be used to support this contention. The first point is a conventional reference to his thinking: one the one hand, “war is an extension of policy;” on the other, “war is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”.
Who translated Clausewitz's On War?
For background on Clausewitz, visit our FAQs page. We also have the older translation of this work, the 1873 translation by Colonel James John Graham, originally published as an appendix to Graham's translation of Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: N. Trübner, 1873), in German Vom Kriege (Berlin: Dümmlers Verlag, 1832).
Why did Clausewitz leave Prussia?
Before Clausewitz left Prussia in 1812 to join the Russian army and resist Napoleon, he prepared an essay on war to leave with the sixteen year-old Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm (later King Friedrich Wilhelm IV, r.1840-1858), whose military tutor he had become in 1810. This essay was called "The most important principles of the art ...
How to direct thrust against enemy wing?
We should direct our main thrust against an enemy wing by attacking it from the front and from the flank, or by turning it completely and attacking it from the rear. Only when we cut off the enemy's line of retreat are we assured of great success in victory.
What is the theory of war?
1. The theory of warfare tries to discover how we may gain a preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the decisive point. As this is not always possible, theory also teaches us to calculate moral factors: the likely mistakes of the enemy, the impression created by a daring action, . . . yes, even our own desperation. None of these things lie outside the realm of the theory and art of war, which is nothing but the result of reasonable reflection on all the possible situations encountered during a war. We should think very frequently of the most dangerous of these situations and familiarize ourselves with it. Only thus shall we reach heroic decisions based on reason, which no critic can ever shake.
Why is the theater of war so difficult?
First, when the regions surrounding the theater of war render operations extremely difficult because of lack of provisions. In this case we avoid a disadvantage which the enemy is forced to undergo. This is the case now (1812) with the Russian army.
What is the principle of war?
This essay is usually referred to as the "Principles of War.". It represented Clausewitz's theoretical development up to that point, translated into a form suitable for his young student. Unfortunately, it has often been treated as a summary of Clausewitz's mature theory—which it most emphatically is not.
Which is more demoralizing, the Cavalry or the Infantry?
Cavalry moves faster than infantry and has a more demoralizing effect on the retreating troops. Next to victory, the act of pursuit is most important in war. (c) To execute a great (strategic) turning move, should we need, because of the detour, a branch of the army which moves more rapidly than the infantry.
What is Clausewitz's theory of war?
Clausewitz’s is rightly called the political theory of war and this links his General Theory and his school of strategic theory with a much broader approach: the classical realist perspective. This sees politics as power and political relations as the history of the acquisition, use and retention of power by and within political communities. This is not to be confused with the crude version that goes under this label today, since classical realism is also a tragic perspective where good intentions can turn into a monstrous reality, or where hubris can lead to a complete downfall. [xvii] Clausewitz thus fits within a wider range of political thought going as far back as Thucydides, but including modern thinkers such as Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau.
Which Clausewitzian theory pertains to all wars?
The portion of Clausewitzian theory that pertains to all wars is referred to as Clausewitz’s General Theory of war . [ii] Much of Clausewitz’s classic On War also refers to both war and warfare in the context of his time, thus forming in effect a theory of early 19th Century warfare distinct from the General Theory.
What is Clausewitzian strategic theory?
Clausewitzian strategic theory starts with the assumption that all wars in history share certain common characteristics; for example, the nature of war itself does not really change, whereas warfare, the ways in which wars are fought, goes through a constant process of change.
What is strategic theory?
[i] Strategic theory is a way of understanding and practicing strategy; but what exactly would make strategic theory Clausewitzian ...
What does the preceding chapter show about war?
The preceding chapter showed that the nature of war is complex and changeable. I now propose to inquire how its nature influences its purpose and its means.
What is the general theory of war?
As mentioned earlier, the General Theory postulates that there exists a system of common attributes to all wars as violent social interactions, and that war belongs to a larger body of human relations and actions known as politics (making all wars a subset of the realm of politics, but not vice versa).
Is the art of war Clausewitzian?
As new methods of warfare emerge and come in to practice, a new approach to warfare for that epoch’s art of war develops, all of which will be by definition Clausewitzian provided they do not contradict the General Theory . Moreover, new military/strategic geniuses will emerge who can define the new art of war through praxis, operating in effect outside of theory, but also retrospectively expanding not only the art of war of that epoch, but also Clausewitz’s strategic theory. Thus analysis of military history using this theory allows retrospectively for theory’s expansion.
What is Clausewitz's most famous saying about war?
This chapter contains Clausewitz's most famous saying about war, that it is the continuation of politics (policy) by other means. Here is the passage in full: 24. WAR IS A MERE CONTINUATION OF POLICY BY OTHER MEANS. We see, therefore, that War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, ...
Why does war stop?
Each Commander can only fully know his own position; that of his opponent can only be known to him by reports, which are uncertain; he may, therefore, form a wrong judgment with respect to it upon data of this description, and, in consequence of that error, he may suppose that the power of taking the initiative rests with his adversary when it lies really with himself . This want of perfect insight might certainly just as often occasion an untimely action as untimely inaction, and hence it would in itself no more contribute to delay than to accelerate action in War. Still, it must always be regarded as one of the natural causes which may bring action in War to a standstill without involving a contradiction. But if we reflect how much more we are inclined and induced to estimate the power of our opponents too high than too low, because it lies in human nature to do so, we shall admit that our imperfect insight into facts in general must contribute very much to delay action in War, and to modify the application of the principles pending our conduct.
Why do civilised nations not put their prisoners to death?
Therefore, if we find civilised nations do not put their prisoners to death, do not devastate towns and countries, this is because their intelligence exercises greater influence on their mode of carrying on War, and has taught them more effectual means of applying force than these rude acts of mere instinct.
How is the act of war removed from the law of forces?
In this manner, the whole act of War is removed from the rigorous law of forces exerted to the utmost. If the extreme is no longer to be apprehended, and no longer to be sought for, it is left to the judgment to determine the limits for the efforts to be made in place of it, and this can only be done on the data furnished by the facts of the real world by the laws of probability. Once the belligerents are no longer mere conceptions, but individual States and Governments, once the War is no longer an ideal, but a definite substantial procedure, then the reality will furnish the data to compute the unknown quantities which are required to be found.
What would happen if the war ended in a single solution?
If War ended in a single solution, or a number of simultaneous ones, then naturally all the preparations for the same would have a tendency to the extreme, for an omission could not in any way be repaired; the utmost, then, that the world of reality could furnish as a guide for us would be the preparations of the enemy, as far as they are known to us; all the rest would fall into the domain of the abstract. But if the result is made up from several successive acts, then naturally that which precedes with all its phases may be taken as a measure for that which will follow, and in this manner the world of reality again takes the place of the abstract, and thus modifies the effort towards the extreme.
How does violence arm itself?
Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power. Violence, that is to say, physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of States and Law), is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order to attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed, and disarmament becomes therefore the immediate object of hostilities in theory. It takes the place of the final object, and puts it aside as something we can eliminate from our calculations.
What is the aim of all action in war?
We have already said that the aim of all action in War is to disarm the enemy, and we shall now show that this, theoretically at least, is indispensable.
